We from what I have read, it stopped people evacuating the building when they could have. I thought that was largely accepted. Of course the people giving the instruction at the time were not aware how the fire would spread.
Did your reading point out it would have been impossible to evacuate all the residents down the stairwells which would have almost certainly lead to an increase of loss of life and injury, as well as making the work of the LFB much harder?
If not, I'd suggest what you've read is part of the plan to cover up government incompetency whilst laying blame elsewhere.
The stay put policy has worked well for many a year. If high rise properties are built in the correct manner using the correct materials it's not that hard to contain a fire. What happened at Grenfell was of course the opposite. Cladding that actually helped spread the fire and the compartment of the building along with fire doors not being up to standard. The fire crews who attended had no way of knowing any of that . I attended many a high rise fire during my 30 years service and never experienced fire spread like that. Now that we know that there are buildings across the country with similar type cladding I'm sure procedures will change . But the point remains if buildings are built correct the stay put policy is the best there is.
The stay put policy has worked well for many a year. If high rise properties are built in the correct manner using the correct materials it's not that hard to contain a fire. What happened at Grenfell was of course the opposite. Cladding that actually helped spread the fire and the compartment of the building along with fire doors not being up to standard. The fire crews who attended had no way of knowing any of that . I attended many a high rise fire during my 30 years service and never experienced fire spread like that. Now that we know that there are buildings across the country with similar type cladding I'm sure procedures will change . But the point remains if buildings are built correct the stay put policy is the best there is.
It is a bit like the Hillsborough disaster, they are looking to smear somebody so the authorities can avoid culpability. They would blame the residents but in this day and age that would cause uproar.
The stay put policy has worked well for many a year. If high rise properties are built in the correct manner using the correct materials it's not that hard to contain a fire. What happened at Grenfell was of course the opposite. Cladding that actually helped spread the fire and the compartment of the building along with fire doors not being up to standard. The fire crews who attended had no way of knowing any of that . I attended many a high rise fire during my 30 years service and never experienced fire spread like that. Now that we know that there are buildings across the country with similar type cladding I'm sure procedures will change . But the point remains if buildings are built correct the stay put policy is the best there is.
It is a bit like the Hillsborough disaster, they are looking to smear somebody so the authorities can avoid culpability. They would blame the residents but in this day and age that would cause uproar.
It was a story of confused communications, being passed by a mixture of computer, radio, and even private mobile phones, via multiple routes, and getting lost along the way so it did not get to where mattered until it was too late to even attempt to evacuate the 5 inhabitants of flat 142.
There appear to have been very obvious short-comings in the communications and the command structure. To what extent this was due to insufficient funding for training and updating of equipment, or whether it was simply management failures, was not clear to me. However, the procedures were obviously not fit for a large scale disaster involving dozens of flats & hundreds of people. Such simple things as the whiteboard (only one?!) at the bridgehead having just 7 spaces to record info about flats containing people trapped by the fire, so info about other flats was written on the wall and not transferred when the bridgehead moved...
Of course, this particular fire was caused by the cladding, and the decisions relating to that were the ultimate cause. And I have no doubt that every firefighter on the ground did their utmost in the circumstances. But having heard this programme I can certainly see where the writer of the Guardian article is coming from.
I've had to change the window specification for a block of 32 flats on the say so of one leaseholder in the block. That saved £24k on the value of the contract and the individual just under £700.
If I believed the two cladding systems at Grenfell Tower performed in exactly the same way, complied with Building Regulations and had the appropriate Agrément Certificates (which the Reynobond PE cladding did possess), I might try and reduce my percentage of the bill by choosing the cheaper alternative. This was not the only change in specification following a value engineering exercise.
What I am saying is no leasholder would want to compromise is her her personal safety - cost perhaps but they can't be expected to know and understand building regs. I know of leasholders who wanted repair work to walkways done by somebody other than Mears, but whilst they had the opportunity to raise concerns the council were always going to go with Mears - who consequently cocked it all up.
This assumes that the leaseholder lives there and isn't an absentee landlord. Many are, particularly in blocks like Grenfell.
So after three and a half years the enquiry is now hearing that the insulation panels were combustible, had a moody fire certificate and were responsible for the spreading of the fire in such a catastrophic way. Three and a half years. To come up with something that most of us probably knew was likely to be the case whilst the building was still alight.
Shocking really. I know these things rightly take time to make sure that a proper and through job is done, but three and a half years ......
So after three and a half years the enquiry is now hearing that the insulation panels were combustible, had a moody fire certificate and were responsible for the spreading of the fire in such a catastrophic way. Three and a half years. To come up with something that most of us probably knew was likely to be the case whilst the building was still alight.
Shocking really. I know these things rightly take time to make sure that a proper and through job is done, but three and a half years ......
Let's not forget that front doors were not compliant albeit the manufacturers claimed they were and also some flats had non fire rated doors on.
Lots of errors, not just the cladding including a confusing Building standards approved document.
So after three and a half years the enquiry is now hearing that the insulation panels were combustible, had a moody fire certificate and were responsible for the spreading of the fire in such a catastrophic way. Three and a half years. To come up with something that most of us probably knew was likely to be the case whilst the building was still alight.
Shocking really. I know these things rightly take time to make sure that a proper and through job is done, but three and a half years ......
Let's not forget that front doors were not compliant albeit the manufacturers claimed they were and also some flats had non fire rated doors on.
Lots of errors, not just the cladding including a confusing Building standards approved document.
Yes, the building was a death trap and seems to have failed on so many points. But it seems to me the cladding was the reason it spread so quickly and to all parts of the building. It just didnt behave like a "normal" fire because of it. If the cladding was made of the right stuff and was fitted properly we probably never would have heard of Grenfell Tower.
So after three and a half years the enquiry is now hearing that the insulation panels were combustible, had a moody fire certificate and were responsible for the spreading of the fire in such a catastrophic way. Three and a half years. To come up with something that most of us probably knew was likely to be the case whilst the building was still alight.
Shocking really. I know these things rightly take time to make sure that a proper and through job is done, but three and a half years ......
Let's not forget that front doors were not compliant albeit the manufacturers claimed they were and also some flats had non fire rated doors on.
Lots of errors, not just the cladding including a confusing Building standards approved document.
Yes, the building was a death trap and seems to have failed on so many points. But it seems to me the cladding was the reason it spread so quickly and to all parts of the building. It just didnt behave like a "normal" fire because of it. If the cladding was made of the right stuff and was fitted properly we probably never would have heard of Grenfell Tower.
Cladding was the reason the actual fire spread like it did. But these multiple horrible failings and mistakes are the reasons for the death toll I think.
I think it is probably best to wait until the Inquiry has finished before people start jumping to conclusions, blame and mud throwing. I have obviously been following the inquiry closely.
There are multiple failings involved in this disaster, which could quite conceivably happen again in most Countries in the World - including the UK.
I think it is probably best to wait until the Inquiry has finished before people start jumping to conclusions, blame and mud throwing. I have obviously been following the inquiry closely.
There are multiple failings involved in this disaster, which could quite conceivably happen again in most Countries in the World - including the UK.
Before I retired one of my key accounts was a large development on the river in West London that are very expensive properties full of London based footballers and their WAGS.
All the blocks are cladded in the same cladding as Grenfell.
I think it is probably best to wait until the Inquiry has finished before people start jumping to conclusions, blame and mud throwing. I have obviously been following the inquiry closely.
There are multiple failings involved in this disaster, which could quite conceivably happen again in most Countries in the World - including the UK.
Before I retired one of my key accounts was a large development on the river in West London that are very expensive properties full of London based footballers and their WAGS.
All the blocks are cladded in the same cladding as Grenfell.
It's quite frightening that this cladding ever got the go ahead to be used. The fire integrity of Grenfell was destroyed once the cladding was put on - there was no way given the building's design that the fire could have spread like this.
I saw a number of residential blocks that got this type of cladding as a facelift - utter madness.
I think it is probably best to wait until the Inquiry has finished before people start jumping to conclusions, blame and mud throwing. I have obviously been following the inquiry closely.
There are multiple failings involved in this disaster, which could quite conceivably happen again in most Countries in the World - including the UK.
Before I retired one of my key accounts was a large development on the river in West London that are very expensive properties full of London based footballers and their WAGS.
All the blocks are cladded in the same cladding as Grenfell.
It's quite frightening that this cladding ever got the go ahead to be used. The fire integrity of Grenfell was destroyed once the cladding was put on - there was no way given the building's design that the fire could have spread like this.
I saw a number of residential blocks that got this type of cladding as a facelift - utter madness.
Unless the fire compartmentation is breached. Each floor should be fire proofed internally & externally
The biggest problem now is it is becoming ridiculously expensive to get any form of PI in the construction industry if there is a risk of fire. Cladding or no cladding.
One policy I was looking at has the following exclusions relating to fire ;
1. the combustibility, fire safety requirements or fire protection
performance of any façade materials, roof materials, cladding, core, filler,
composite, insulation, glazing, balconies, terraces, doors, hatches, signage,
decorative panels, roof voids, roof cavities, chimneys, flues, external wall
system and/or internal wall system of any building or structure, external roof
system and/or internal roof system above the ceiling level of the upper-most
storey of any building or structure, including but not limited to any component
or material used for the external cladding or façades or roofs of any building
or structure, insulation, and signage, and the manufacture, assembly, fixing or
construction thereof;
2. any aspect of fire safety or fire performance of a building or
structure; including but not limited to warning of fire, escape from the
building or structure in the event of fire, fire spread, structural integrity,
the provision of access and facilities to the emergency services and/or the provision
of premises not fit for habitation;
3. any aspect of fire safety or
fire performance of a building or structure not falling within 1. or 2. above.
So it's no longer just the cladding that is a concern to the insurers - it's fire alarms, roofing, glazing, insulation, the walls themselves. Anything related to fire.
I know of a cladding company who used to pay £20k a year for the Professional Indemnity but immediately after Grenfell it shot to £220k per year. The company folded straight away.
So if nobody can get Insurance maybe that would explain why nothing is being done to remediate the many thousands of buildings still deemed "at risk".
I think it is probably best to wait until the Inquiry has finished before people start jumping to conclusions, blame and mud throwing. I have obviously been following the inquiry closely.
There are multiple failings involved in this disaster, which could quite conceivably happen again in most Countries in the World - including the UK.
Before I retired one of my key accounts was a large development on the river in West London that are very expensive properties full of London based footballers and their WAGS.
All the blocks are cladded in the same cladding as Grenfell.
It's quite frightening that this cladding ever got the go ahead to be used. The fire integrity of Grenfell was destroyed once the cladding was put on - there was no way given the building's design that the fire could have spread like this.
I saw a number of residential blocks that got this type of cladding as a facelift - utter madness.
Unless the fire compartmentation is breached. Each floor should be fire proofed internally & externally
Each apartment should have a minimum of 60 minutes compartmentation I believe. We've inspected buildings where the "fire stopping" is actually an accelerant. The materials used to compartment a dwelling are actually worse than standard plasterboard. Makes you wonder if this will ever get resolved to any level of satisfaction without just knocking them over and starting again
I think it is probably best to wait until the Inquiry has finished before people start jumping to conclusions, blame and mud throwing. I have obviously been following the inquiry closely.
There are multiple failings involved in this disaster, which could quite conceivably happen again in most Countries in the World - including the UK.
Before I retired one of my key accounts was a large development on the river in West London that are very expensive properties full of London based footballers and their WAGS.
All the blocks are cladded in the same cladding as Grenfell.
It's quite frightening that this cladding ever got the go ahead to be used. The fire integrity of Grenfell was destroyed once the cladding was put on - there was no way given the building's design that the fire could have spread like this.
I saw a number of residential blocks that got this type of cladding as a facelift - utter madness.
Unless the fire compartmentation is breached. Each floor should be fire proofed internally & externally
The original building lost its fire integrity once this cladding was put on. Without the cladding given the building's original design and materials there is no way the fire could have spread or taken hold in this way.
Somebody should be charged with corporate manslaughter but this won't happen.
The biggest problem now is it is becoming ridiculously expensive to get any form of PI in the construction industry if there is a risk of fire. Cladding or no cladding.
One policy I was looking at has the following exclusions relating to fire ;
1. the combustibility, fire safety requirements or fire protection
performance of any façade materials, roof materials, cladding, core, filler,
composite, insulation, glazing, balconies, terraces, doors, hatches, signage,
decorative panels, roof voids, roof cavities, chimneys, flues, external wall
system and/or internal wall system of any building or structure, external roof
system and/or internal roof system above the ceiling level of the upper-most
storey of any building or structure, including but not limited to any component
or material used for the external cladding or façades or roofs of any building
or structure, insulation, and signage, and the manufacture, assembly, fixing or
construction thereof;
2. any aspect of fire safety or fire performance of a building or
structure; including but not limited to warning of fire, escape from the
building or structure in the event of fire, fire spread, structural integrity,
the provision of access and facilities to the emergency services and/or the provision
of premises not fit for habitation;
3. any aspect of fire safety or
fire performance of a building or structure not falling within 1. or 2. above.
So it's no longer just the cladding that is a concern to the insurers - it's fire alarms, roofing, glazing, insulation, the walls themselves. Anything related to fire.
I know of a cladding company who used to pay £20k a year for the Professional Indemnity but immediately after Grenfell it shot to £220k per year. The company folded straight away.
So if nobody can get Insurance maybe that would explain why nothing is being done to remediate the many thousands of buildings still deemed "at risk".
The consequences of this scandal are huge and will run for many years. Getting EWS1 certification will take ages and getting the work done could cost a small fortune - a lot of home owners will be ruined and potentially bankrupted in the process.
Another national scandal caused by inept bureaucrats and politicians. Nobody will take the blame for it.
Yet despite these revelations LFB have already been hung out to dry.
This part of the inquiry should have been done first before looking at LFB's response.
The leadership shown by the Fire Brigade on that evening was inadequate - the reluctance of those in charge that evening to even acknowledge this was a disgrace. The attitude of Dany Cotton in some of the interviews I saw was appalling yet people still defend her.
Fire fighters and residents were let down that evening - the 'stay put' policy was only rescinded once Andy Roe took over.
You only improve if you can accept criticism and change procedures - nobody should be exempt from this.
Yet despite these revelations LFB have already been hung out to dry.
This part of the inquiry should have been done first before looking at LFB's response.
The leadership shown by the Fire Brigade on that evening was inadequate - the reluctance of those in charge that evening to even acknowledge this was a disgrace. The attitude of Dany Cotton in some of the interviews I saw was appalling yet people still defend her.
Fire fighters and residents were let down that evening - the 'stay put' policy was only rescinded once Andy Roe took over.
You only improve if you can accept criticism and change procedures - nobody should be exempt from this.
I'm not disputing that at all, especially as my role is looking at learning and improvement for Kent Fire and Rescue Service.
However, the conditions that LFB were faced with that night were unprecedented with the building not behaving as it should have done. The only reason for this is because of the cladding, which the revelations being uncovered now are proving.
In our formal debrief process here in Kent we always look at the history of a premises prior to to the response to the incident, what we knew about it, and how this may have had an impact on the response. This should have been the same for this inquiry.
Yet despite these revelations LFB have already been hung out to dry.
This part of the inquiry should have been done first before looking at LFB's response.
The leadership shown by the Fire Brigade on that evening was inadequate - the reluctance of those in charge that evening to even acknowledge this was a disgrace. The attitude of Dany Cotton in some of the interviews I saw was appalling yet people still defend her.
Fire fighters and residents were let down that evening - the 'stay put' policy was only rescinded once Andy Roe took over.
You only improve if you can accept criticism and change procedures - nobody should be exempt from this.
I'm not disputing that at all, especially as my role is looking at learning and improvement for Kent Fire and Rescue Service.
However, the conditions that LFB were faced with that night were unprecedented with the building not behaving as it should have done. The only reason for this is because of the cladding, which the revelations being uncovered now are proving.
In our formal debrief process here in Kent we always look at the history of a premises prior to to the response to the incident, what we knew about it, and how this may have had an impact on the response. This should have been the same for this inquiry.
The LFB leadership that evening could have been better - it's insulting to the memory of those that died to not acknowledge this. Some of the interviews that Dany Cotton gave were appallingly insensitive and she seemed unable to accept that things could have been done differently.
If you're in charge you have to make educated decisions sometimes which is what Andy Roe did. Even more lives may have been lost if the 'stay put' order had not been rescinded. It ultimately boils down to the fact whether you think the order should have been rescinded earlier.
The bravery of individual fire fighters is not in question- it's more about the quality of the leadership. Once it became obvious the fire integrity of the building had been breached the 'stay put' policy stopped making sense.
I might be slapped down for this, but I don't think the whole issue is down to that particular cladding. It was the whole design of which the cladding is an element of.
Generally speaking at every floor level and around openings a fire break should be incorporated, the performance spec will dertimine either 30/60/90 minutes.
The cladding is designed in a wall to allow for an air gap approximately 25mm but shouldn't be no less, to allow for airflow and reduce condensation build up.
The Insulation used to what I assume to be a PIR is a very highly flammable product and I have used this around 75% of the time over the last 6/7 years in various developments and scenarios. The thickness of insulation again will be dertimined by the performance spec and what u value they wish to achieve.
What you had was the perfect storm and it was a tradegy that so many people lost their lives so soon, but as always it will be a lessons learnt situation where the regs and design will be changed to eridcate such unnecessary loss of life in the future.
What is becoming apparent throughout the enquiry is the lack of knowledge and accountability. Money is king and is always the driving force behind majority of key construction related decisions.
You would think there wouldn't be any high buildings with dangerous cladding still on them but seemingly there are hundreds. It destroys your faith in how seriously this is taken.
The fact that it has taken so long tells you why the disaster happened. Idiots like me who know nothing about it assume that when you have previous fires and warnings before the disaster the disaster shouldn't happen. But we are told to pipe down by 'experts' and wait for the enquiry. This happened three years ago and nothing that we didn't expect has come out to date.
Surely it is not unreasonable to expect warnings to be acted on. What is wrong with assuming that should be the case?
You would think there wouldn't be any high buildings with dangerous cladding still on them but seemingly there are hundreds. It destroys your faith in how seriously this is taken.
The fact that it has taken so long tells you why the disaster happened. Idiots like me who know nothing about it assume that when you have previous fires and warnings before the disaster the disaster shouldn't happen. But we are told to pipe down by 'experts' and wait for the enquiry. This happened three years ago and nothing that we didn't expect has come out to date.
Surely it is not unreasonable to expect warnings to be acted on. What is wrong with assuming that should be the case?
I stopped assuming building regulations were taken that seriously in this country some time ago. The attitude now seems to be to do things on the cheap if you can and forget about quality/safety.
After the fires at Lakanal House and Grenfell Tower what has really changed? This country is a disgrace.
Comments
If not, I'd suggest what you've read is part of the plan to cover up government incompetency whilst laying blame elsewhere.
If high rise properties are built in the correct manner using the correct materials it's not that hard to contain a fire.
What happened at Grenfell was of course the opposite.
Cladding that actually helped spread the fire and the compartment of the building along with fire doors not being up to standard.
The fire crews who attended had no way of knowing any of that .
I attended many a high rise fire during my 30 years service and never experienced fire spread like that.
Now that we know that there are buildings across the country with similar type cladding I'm sure procedures will change .
But the point remains if buildings are built correct the stay put policy is the best there is.
It was a story of confused communications, being passed by a mixture of computer, radio, and even private mobile phones, via multiple routes, and getting lost along the way so it did not get to where mattered until it was too late to even attempt to evacuate the 5 inhabitants of flat 142.
There appear to have been very obvious short-comings in the communications and the command structure. To what extent this was due to insufficient funding for training and updating of equipment, or whether it was simply management failures, was not clear to me. However, the procedures were obviously not fit for a large scale disaster involving dozens of flats & hundreds of people. Such simple things as the whiteboard (only one?!) at the bridgehead having just 7 spaces to record info about flats containing people trapped by the fire, so info about other flats was written on the wall and not transferred when the bridgehead moved...
Of course, this particular fire was caused by the cladding, and the decisions relating to that were the ultimate cause. And I have no doubt that every firefighter on the ground did their utmost in the circumstances. But having heard this programme I can certainly see where the writer of the Guardian article is coming from.
This assumes that the leaseholder lives there and isn't an absentee landlord. Many are, particularly in blocks like Grenfell.
More scandal. Nobody will be held accountable.
A disgrace across the board.
Shocking really. I know these things rightly take time to make sure that a proper and through job is done, but three and a half years ......
Lots of errors, not just the cladding including a confusing Building standards approved document.
It says a lot about our shoddy authorities in the UK. Those who died were failed by so many people.
Unless there is change the inquiry is pointless.
There are multiple failings involved in this disaster, which could quite conceivably happen again in most Countries in the World - including the UK.
All the blocks are cladded in the same cladding as Grenfell.
I saw a number of residential blocks that got this type of cladding as a facelift - utter madness.
The biggest problem now is it is becoming ridiculously expensive to get any form of PI in the construction industry if there is a risk of fire. Cladding or no cladding.
One policy I was looking at has the following exclusions relating to fire ;
1. the combustibility, fire safety requirements or fire protection performance of any façade materials, roof materials, cladding, core, filler, composite, insulation, glazing, balconies, terraces, doors, hatches, signage, decorative panels, roof voids, roof cavities, chimneys, flues, external wall system and/or internal wall system of any building or structure, external roof system and/or internal roof system above the ceiling level of the upper-most storey of any building or structure, including but not limited to any component or material used for the external cladding or façades or roofs of any building or structure, insulation, and signage, and the manufacture, assembly, fixing or construction thereof;
2. any aspect of fire safety or fire performance of a building or structure; including but not limited to warning of fire, escape from the building or structure in the event of fire, fire spread, structural integrity, the provision of access and facilities to the emergency services and/or the provision of premises not fit for habitation;3. any aspect of fire safety or fire performance of a building or structure not falling within 1. or 2. above.
So it's no longer just the cladding that is a concern to the insurers - it's fire alarms, roofing, glazing, insulation, the walls themselves. Anything related to fire.
I know of a cladding company who used to pay £20k a year for the Professional Indemnity but immediately after Grenfell it shot to £220k per year. The company folded straight away.
So if nobody can get Insurance maybe that would explain why nothing is being done to remediate the many thousands of buildings still deemed "at risk".
Somebody should be charged with corporate manslaughter but this won't happen.
Another national scandal caused by inept bureaucrats and politicians. Nobody will take the blame for it.
This part of the inquiry should have been done first before looking at LFB's response.
Fire fighters and residents were let down that evening - the 'stay put' policy was only rescinded once Andy Roe took over.
You only improve if you can accept criticism and change procedures - nobody should be exempt from this.
However, the conditions that LFB were faced with that night were unprecedented with the building not behaving as it should have done. The only reason for this is because of the cladding, which the revelations being uncovered now are proving.
In our formal debrief process here in Kent we always look at the history of a premises prior to to the response to the incident, what we knew about it, and how this may have had an impact on the response. This should have been the same for this inquiry.
If you're in charge you have to make educated decisions sometimes which is what Andy Roe did. Even more lives may have been lost if the 'stay put' order had not been rescinded. It ultimately boils down to the fact whether you think the order should have been rescinded earlier.
The bravery of individual fire fighters is not in question- it's more about the quality of the leadership. Once it became obvious the fire integrity of the building had been breached the 'stay put' policy stopped making sense.
Generally speaking at every floor level and around openings a fire break should be incorporated, the performance spec will dertimine either 30/60/90 minutes.
The cladding is designed in a wall to allow for an air gap approximately 25mm but shouldn't be no less, to allow for airflow and reduce condensation build up.
The Insulation used to what I assume to be a PIR is a very highly flammable product and I have used this around 75% of the time over the last 6/7 years in various developments and scenarios. The thickness of insulation again will be dertimined by the performance spec and what u value they wish to achieve.
What you had was the perfect storm and it was a tradegy that so many people lost their lives so soon, but as always it will be a lessons learnt situation where the regs and design will be changed to eridcate such unnecessary loss of life in the future.
What is becoming apparent throughout the enquiry is the lack of knowledge and accountability. Money is king and is always the driving force behind majority of key construction related decisions.
The fact that it has taken so long tells you why the disaster happened. Idiots like me who know nothing about it assume that when you have previous fires and warnings before the disaster the disaster shouldn't happen. But we are told to pipe down by 'experts' and wait for the enquiry. This happened three years ago and nothing that we didn't expect has come out to date.
Surely it is not unreasonable to expect warnings to be acted on. What is wrong with assuming that should be the case?
After the fires at Lakanal House and Grenfell Tower what has really changed? This country is a disgrace.
This is the best the Government can come up with and with Robert Jenrick at the helm not a lot is going to happen.
The worst yet. What a c***!