Post Office Horizon scandal

Paula Vennells' charity work (msn.com)

ME14addick said:

Huskaris said:

ME14addick said:

Lincsaddick said:

this affair is gonna roll on and on for months, possibly even years .. another barristers bonanza .. surely the priority is to get compensation to those unjustly criminalised and/or out of pocket .. I suspect there are so many vested interests now involved, that this will still take ages longer than it should ..
what should happen is for the C P S to drag a few post office and fujitsu high ups at the peak of the situation into court and let's see what transpires .. stop all this pussy footing and fannying about 

I doubt that any charges will be brought until the inquiry is finished. Nothing less than a prison sentence will do for quite a few of those involved in this scandal.

Pretty sure the head of the met said exactly this. 

He also said there is a big difference between incompetence and PROVING knowledgeable cover ups etc to pervert the course of justice. 

I'd start with that bully chap from a few weeks back, I am sure that there are a good few people who would meet the criminal threshold in my opinion. Not sure it will be any of the "top" people, but sole people 100% would have known. 

Enough evidence so far that those at the very top knew what was going on and participated in the cover up. I'd be very surprised if Paula Vennells escapes prosecution.

good post, however I'll be surprised if Vennells is prosecuted, I suspect she knows far too much political and financial dirt that was swept under many carpets and that the 'powers that be' want the dirt kept right where it is .. not to say I wouldn't like to see her experience what her bully boys antics brought to many sub postmasters, including sending an innocent pregnant woman to prison as well as several other men and women

Off_it said:

Valley Ant said:

A separate point that puzzles me.
I wonder whether the shortfalls happened every day or were sporadic.
If it was every day then I wonder whether any sub postmaster asked the PO to send a person over to run it for a day and see for themselves.
Apologies if this was covered in the TV programme as I haven't watched it.

Puzzles me too.

From what I've read it seems the problems were random and sporadic. Not every terminal had a problem and those that did didn't seem have a problem all of the time. Which the IT experts will probably tell us makes it more difficult to identify and fix than a problem affecting all the terminals, or some of the terminals all of the time, where presumably the issue is easier to isolate and change/fix.

That's why I suspect the PO took the line that their system was "robust", not perfect but robust, because it handled millions of transactions each day and in that context only a relatively small number of "problems" arose. For the vast majority of transactions it possibly even did the job it was supposed to do right from the start and possibly still does.

And up to that point I would say "fair enough". Any new system will have problems and bugs that need ironing out. Anyone with even indirect experience of new systems coming in will know and appreciate that. It happens, you just have to deal with it, work through it and sort it as soon as you can.

Which all goes to make the decision to go ahead with the prosecutions, destroying ordinary innocent peoples live, even more difficult to fathom or understand. No doubt there's Olympic size levels of incompetence gone on at all levels, but some people somewhere took the decision not just to do nothing, but to actively press ahead with persecuting people when they knew, THEY MUST HAVE KNOWN, that the evidence against them was doubtful, to put it mildly. The c***s.

There were also incidents of SPO's suddenly being informed by PO of discrepancies about which they knew nothing at all - just after said SPO had raised an issue or complaint about systems.  Worst of which was the case of Michael Rudkin who saw first hand that Fujitsu staff had unfettered access to SPO Horizon accounts and questioned its legitimacy.
Days later out of the blue there's a massive discrepancy on his branch's Horizon he gets sacked and his Mrs (the SPO) gets convicted.  Coincidence? Yeah right.
Jo Hamilton watched her 'discrepancy' double while she was on the phone to the 'helpdesk' trying to sort it out.
To anyone who's ever done any bookkeeping, trying to correct an error and doubling it is easily done by the uninitiated.  The helpdesk jockeys were tech nerds of course not bankers, accountants with relevant competencies.
PO and its government representative shareholder were still swearing black was white, threatening journalists, blowing bundles on lawyers as late as 2015 when BBC Panorama went public with Mr Bates et al's stories and critically had an eye witness from Fujitsu.  I have no idea what level of arrogance/stupid/delusion was required to stick to their story when it had been publicly dismantled.  Angela van den Bogerd, the PR chief, was still insisting Fujitsu access didn't exist 4 years after the whistle blower revealed the truth. It was subsequently claimed she said that cos she didn't know the truth.  Ernst & Young had raised it with PO in 2011!

The latest chairman of PO, Henry Staunton, has today "stepped down".  He'd only been in post since December 2022 but obviously took the role in full knowledge of all the stink

Michael Keegan who was head of Fujitsu in UK during part of the PO scandal, has had a Cabinet Office role managing the relationship between HMGov and BAe Systems, until yesterday when he resigned his CO post.
Michael Keegan is married to Gillian Keegan who is the Education Secretary - that's a cabinet post in the current regime.

After leaving PO Paula Vennells got a role in NHS, with assistance/approval from tory peer Dido Harding of Test'n'Trace "fame" (£37Bn down the shitter test'n'trace fame)

And we wonder why people think the corruption goes all the way to the very top!

PragueAddick said:

@Billy_Mix good post above, and especially thanks for identifying Michael Rudkin as the guy depicted in the dramatisation. If I recall, wasn’t he also the leader of an association of postmasters? He was susbsequently shown at various meetings organised by Alan Bates as someone virtually crushed by the oppressive system. You’d find a lot of people like that today who have spoken out as he did, but mainly in Russia. 

I don’t think enough has been made of his case. Unlike a lot of the other victims he was already very savvy with the system - it was his role to be so, and he was portrayed as visiting Fujitsu expecting to be able return with reassuring news for the people he represented. He rumbled that they had anonymous access, they realised that he’d rumbled it, and days later he’s a victim. That is downright sinister.

People may say, “don’t forget this was a dramatisation” to which I say, a real person is portrayed and I believe there is no dispute (now, because initially they erased visitor records) that he made  that visit, saw what he saw, and days later got turned over. And ITV have lawyers, and for something like this they will have been on full throttle going over every line of the script. I hope the inquiry is equally diligent going over his case and identifying everyone involved in his case.

I think he was mentioned regarding his trip to Fujitsu in a Panarama.

valleynick66 said:

What i dont get is how the ‘no access’ by Fujitsu staff is being DESCRIBED/ INTERPRETED. 

Super users / admin can always go in the ‘back door’ of a system. 

I think some people are justifying their action or inaction by hiding behind some specific wording about what different staff could or could not do. 

Does this mean that someone at Apple can log on to my phone as a superuser and run my banking app?

These were meant to be local computers.

stevexreeve said:

valleynick66 said:

What i dont get is how the ‘no access’ by Fujitsu staff is being DESCRIBED/ INTERPRETED. 

Super users / admin can always go in the ‘back door’ of a system. 

I think some people are justifying their action or inaction by hiding behind some specific wording about what different staff could or could not do. 

Does this mean that someone at Apple can log on to my phone as a superuser and run my banking app?

These were meant to be local computers.

With the best will in the world, every single computer in a network is connected to it for a multitude of reasons. Networks have been absolutely essential for over 30 years. 

'Remote access' has been a thing for as long as networks have been a thing. 

The problem here isn't the fact they were connected to a network, or even the fact that access to the remotely was possible. The problem is that Fujitsu had access remotely, and the postmasters didn't know it. 

Off_it said:

Leroy Ambrose said:

stevexreeve said:

valleynick66 said:

What i dont get is how the ‘no access’ by Fujitsu staff is being DESCRIBED/ INTERPRETED. 

Super users / admin can always go in the ‘back door’ of a system. 

I think some people are justifying their action or inaction by hiding behind some specific wording about what different staff could or could not do. 

Does this mean that someone at Apple can log on to my phone as a superuser and run my banking app?

These were meant to be local computers.

With the best will in the world, every single computer in a network is connected to it for a multitude of reasons. Networks have been absolutely essential for over 30 years. 

'Remote access' has been a thing for as long as networks have been a thing. 

The problem here isn't the fact they were connected to a network, or even the fact that access to the remotely was possible. The problem is that Fujitsu had access remotely, and the postmasters didn't know it. 

And the fact that anyone else could have any remote access was consistently denied.

Agreed. But surely any system ultimately has this capability/vulnerability is my point?

Admin can always go behind the scenes. 

valleynick66 said:

Off_it said:

Leroy Ambrose said:

stevexreeve said:

valleynick66 said:

What i dont get is how the ‘no access’ by Fujitsu staff is being DESCRIBED/ INTERPRETED. 

Super users / admin can always go in the ‘back door’ of a system. 

I think some people are justifying their action or inaction by hiding behind some specific wording about what different staff could or could not do. 

Does this mean that someone at Apple can log on to my phone as a superuser and run my banking app?

These were meant to be local computers.

With the best will in the world, every single computer in a network is connected to it for a multitude of reasons. Networks have been absolutely essential for over 30 years. 

'Remote access' has been a thing for as long as networks have been a thing. 

The problem here isn't the fact they were connected to a network, or even the fact that access to the remotely was possible. The problem is that Fujitsu had access remotely, and the postmasters didn't know it. 

And the fact that anyone else could have any remote access was consistently denied.

Agreed. But surely any system ultimately has this capability/vulnerability is my point?

Admin can always go behind the scenes. 

My point was the denial isn’t (to me) credible  in high level terms. 

But perhaps the denial was based on very careful use of language / description of scenarios when / where access is audited / intended  etc. 

That doesn’t justify it to be clear. 

When you log on to your computer or laptop at work your computer joins the network.

But that doesn't mean that anyone in the IT department can access your computer and send emails, run your personal banking app, download porn or initiate transactions. 

Yes - they can poke data into databases on the servers or adjust logs but they cannot log on to your computer unless you give them explicit permission or your password.

If your company are able to logon to your networked computer at work they should tell you and you need to be very very careful! 

valleynick66 said:

What i dont get is how the ‘no access’ by Fujitsu staff is being DESCRIBED/ INTERPRETED. 

Super users / admin can always go in the ‘back door’ of a system. 

I think some people are justifying their action or inaction by hiding behind some specific wording about what different staff could or could not do. 

It would appear to me that this level of 'Admin/Super User' was significantly lowered to the level of support user that wouldn't normally be seen in the commercial world, to help Fujitsu/Post Office cover their backs. I bet their support staff of the day could tell a tale or two but are probably gagged.

stevexreeve said:

valleynick66 said:

Off_it said:

Leroy Ambrose said:

stevexreeve said:

valleynick66 said:

What i dont get is how the ‘no access’ by Fujitsu staff is being DESCRIBED/ INTERPRETED. 

Super users / admin can always go in the ‘back door’ of a system. 

I think some people are justifying their action or inaction by hiding behind some specific wording about what different staff could or could not do. 

Does this mean that someone at Apple can log on to my phone as a superuser and run my banking app?

These were meant to be local computers.

With the best will in the world, every single computer in a network is connected to it for a multitude of reasons. Networks have been absolutely essential for over 30 years. 

'Remote access' has been a thing for as long as networks have been a thing. 

The problem here isn't the fact they were connected to a network, or even the fact that access to the remotely was possible. The problem is that Fujitsu had access remotely, and the postmasters didn't know it. 

And the fact that anyone else could have any remote access was consistently denied.

Agreed. But surely any system ultimately has this capability/vulnerability is my point?

Admin can always go behind the scenes. 

My point was the denial isn’t (to me) credible  in high level terms. 

But perhaps the denial was based on very careful use of language / description of scenarios when / where access is audited / intended  etc. 

That doesn’t justify it to be clear. 

When you log on to your computer or laptop at work your computer joins the network.

But that doesn't mean that anyone in the IT department can access your computer and send emails, run your personal banking app, download porn or initiate transactions. 

Yes - they can poke data into databases on the servers or adjust logs but they cannot log on to your computer unless you give them explicit permission or your password.

If your company are able to logon to your networked computer at work they should tell you and you need to be very very careful! 

I was only referring to the latter I.e. adjusting entries etc. 

That remains my point. 

PragueAddick said:

@Billy_Mix good post above, and especially thanks for identifying Michael Rudkin as the guy depicted in the dramatisation. If I recall, wasn’t he also the leader of an association of postmasters? He was susbsequently shown at various meetings organised by Alan Bates as someone virtually crushed by the oppressive system. You’d find a lot of people like that today who have spoken out as he did, but mainly in Russia. 

I don’t think enough has been made of his case. Unlike a lot of the other victims he was already very savvy with the system - it was his role to be so, and he was portrayed as visiting Fujitsu expecting to be able return with reassuring news for the people he represented. He rumbled that they had anonymous access, they realised that he’d rumbled it, and days later he’s a victim. That is downright sinister.

People may say, “don’t forget this was a dramatisation” to which I say, a real person is portrayed and I believe there is no dispute (now, because initially they erased visitor records) that he made  that visit, saw what he saw, and days later got turned over. And ITV have lawyers, and for something like this they will have been on full throttle going over every line of the script. I hope the inquiry is equally diligent going over his case and identifying everyone involved in his case.

A drama with actors playing the roles of real people across the majority of the cast sure.  The scriptwriters producers and director are on the record as saying that almost everything attributed to identifiable characters is copied from transcripts.  The PO and Fujitsu threatened all concerned with the full weight of their very costly lawyers if to paraphrase 'you make us look bad and any of it is even slightly misleading, let alone untrue.'  The very least PO & F would have achieved would have been to defer and delay anything coming to screen.  To avoid such costs and delays the production company had to stick to what was already very much matters of record. This was made in the last couple of years - a decade on from BBC's Panorama and after some convictions were overturned. Judges had ruled on POs malfeasance yet its executives and lawyers were still determined to deflect, deny and obfuscate, all the while doubling down on the livelihoods and lives they had so diligently destroyed.
And essentially all with we, the taxpayers', money.